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Articles
New York City Rules!
Regulatory Models for Environmental and
Public Health
Jason J. Czarnezki*
Scholars have become increasingly interested in facilitating improvement in
environmental and public health at the local level. Over the last few years, former New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and the New York City Council have proposed
and adopted numerous environmental and public health initiatives, providing a useful
case study for analyzing the development and success (or failure) of various regulatory
tools, and offering larger lessons about regulation that can be extrapolated to other
substantive areas. This Article, first, seeks to categorize and evaluate these “New York
Rules,” creating a new taxonomy to understand different types of regulation. These “New
York Rules” include bans, informational regulation, education, infrastructure, mandates,
standard-setting, and economic (dis)incentives. In particular, this Article focuses on
urban transportation and food systems, including the failed market-based congestion
pricing plan for Lower Manhattan; the Citi Bike infrastructure; the proposed “Sugary
Drink” ban; informational calorie labeling on food menus; and the emerging compost
pollution prevention plan. This Article provides insight into the challenge of matching the
proper regulatory tool with any environmental and public health problem, suggesting that
certain approaches are more appropriate than others. In general, society requires more
forceful nudges than seen to date and, where this kind of push is not possible,
policymakers should proceed to lay the groundwork with norm-shifting regulation.
Infrastructure shifts are also a successful type of intervention when more intrusive
regulation fails. In summary, law proves to be a workable tool to change individual
behavior, and major government action can influence social norms and create improved
infrastructure.

* Jason J. Czarnezki, A.B., J.D., University of Chicago; Gilbert and Sarah Kerlin Distinguished
Professor of Environmental Law and Executive Director of Environmental Law Programs, Pace Law
School. I wish to thank Sharon Jacobs for her outstanding commentary and suggested revisions on an
earlier draft of this Article, and Steven E. Gavin (J.D. Candidate, Pace Law School, 2014) for his
valuable research assistance, as well as attendees of the Kerlin Lecture at Pace Law School in
September 2013, participants in the 2013 Colloquium on Environmental Scholarship at Vermont Law
School, and Katrina Kuh and participants in the Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra
University Faculty Workshop.
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Introduction
Scholars and policymakers alike have become increasingly interested
in uniting environmental and public health policy at both the global and
local level. Given the lack of environmental legislation passed at the
national level in the United States since the 1970s, this should come as no
surprise. Instead, examples of environmental progress can be found in
harnessing local action, especially in urban metropolises around the globe,
1
to remedy global environmental concerns.
Environmental law must now contend with the globalization of
2
environmental harm. The democratization of pollution sources, and
3
“environmental legal norms have become increasingly internationalized.”
However, the globalization of environmental law and policy is not without
irony. Pollution sources and public health concerns remain domestic and
increasingly localized despite international impacts. In light of global
environmental problems, lacks of forthcoming international or national
solutions, and increased focus on local actions, it makes sense to spend
some time thinking about approaches to regulation at the local level.
“Local environmental law” has proliferated in an attempt to improve
quality of life for individuals and their communities while simultaneously
seeking to improve global environmental concerns. Such “local
1. See, e.g., Katrina Fischer Kuh, Capturing Individual Harms, 35 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 155,
162–66 (2011); Sarah B. Schindler, Banning Lawns, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 394, 396 (2014).
2. Jason J. Czarnezki, Everyday Environmentalism: Law, Nature & Individual Behavior 141
(2011) (citing Timothy P. Duane, Environmental Planning and Policy in a Post-Rio World, 7 Berkeley
Planning J. 27, 31 (1992)).
3. Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence of Global Environmental Law,
36 Ecology L.Q. 615, 615 (2009).
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environmental law” often pursues such change through the regulation of
individual behavior and activities associated with the living of our daily
lives.
“[P]erhaps the greatest challenge in changing individual behavior is
recognizing that the proper law, regulatory tool, or public policy
initiative must be matched to the appropriate behavior to effectively
4
facilitate change.” The challenges facing local environmental regulation
are, in many cases, the same as those affecting regulatory systems of all sizes.
A more challenging query is whether there is anything that distinguishes
the matching problem at the local level from matching at other levels,
such as civic engagement, and does this difference impact regulatory
success? That is, whether with more citizen involvement cognitive biases
have freer rein. This Article provides insight into this challenge of matching
the proper regulatory tool to solve environmental and public health
problems.
The key challenge is matching the proper tools to the behavior or
norm that requires modification. Tools include informational disclosures
(like eco-labels and informational schedules), economic and marketbased incentives (such as subsidies and taxes), traditional regulatory
measures that permit or ban behavior, and standards for pollution,
energy efficiency and product performance. The advantage of nonenforcement approaches, however, like information, public education,
and market-based incentives, is that they offer ‘ex ante approaches that
seek to prevent noncompliance from occurring in the first place.
Regulatory methods designed to influence individual behavior,
recognizing their advantages and disadvantages, combined with public
education may be sufficient to achieve norm and behavioral change,
5
when tailored to meet the particular harm and audience.

Over the last few years, former New York City Mayor Michael
Bloomberg and the New York City Council proposed and adopted
numerous environmental and public health initiatives, providing an amazing
case study for analyzing the development and success (or failure) of various
regulatory tools. This Article seeks to categorize and evaluate a subset of
these “New York Rules” which include:
 Bans: foam containers, sugary drinks, smoking in public spaces,
trans fat, displaying tobacco products;
 Informational regulation: displaying food calorie information;
 Education: marketing campaign about the dangers of excess
drinking;
 Infrastructure: salad bars in schools, public space recycling,
bike lanes, tree planting;
 Mandates: e-waste recycling;

4. Czarnezki, supra note 2, at 2.
5. Id. at 148–49 (citing Hope M. Babcock, Assuming Personal Responsibility for Improving the
Environment: Moving Toward a New Environmental Norm, 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 117, 165 (2009)).
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 Standard-setting: energy efficient building standards; and
 Economic (dis)incentives: congestion pricing.

This Article hopes to instruct on the effectiveness of such regulatory
tools in terms of their acceptance by the public, passage by the legislature,
implementation and enforcement by the executive, environmental and
public health outcomes. It also will evaluate how New York City
6
successfully addressed “environmentally significant individual behaviors”
in the specific sectors of urban transportation and food systems.
In particular, this Article broadens the conception of environmental
law beyond the federal statutes passed in the 1970s and offers insight into
7
the modern role of the State in promoting environmental and public health.
In discussing old and new approaches to regulation, Professor Lawrence
Lessig writes:
Both the old school and new share an approach to regulation that
focuses on regulators other than the law. Both, that is, aim to
understand structures of regulation outside law’s direct effect. Where
they differ is in the lessons that they draw from such alternative
structures. From the fact that forces outside law regulate, and regulate
better than law, the old school concludes that law should step aside.
This is not the conclusion of the new school. The old school identifies
alternative regulators as reasons for less activism. The new school
identifies alternatives as additional tools for a more effective activism.
The moral of the old school is that the state should do less. The hope of
8
the new is that the state can do more.

This Article can be seen as part of a regulatory approach that, unlike the
old school, does not see alternative approaches (such as, individual
behavior or social norms) as displacing law; “[r]ather, the new school
9
views them as each subject to law.”
This Article provides an initial framework for determining how
regulation can be more effective in shifting individual behavior and social
norms. It focuses on the challenge of matching the proper regulatory tool
to solve any environmental and public health problem, suggesting that
certain approaches are more appropriate than others. Part I of this
Article outlines the regulatory methods available for addressing
environmental and public health harms. Part II describes the various
environmental and public health initiatives recently proposed and
implemented in New York City, providing a new taxonomy to understand

6. Katrina Fischer Kuh, When Government Intrudes: Regulating Individual Behaviors that Harm
the Environment, 61 Duke L.J. 1111, 1117 (2012).
7. See Jason J. Czarnezki, The New Chicago School & Environmental Law (working draft on file
with author). See generally Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661 (1998)
(introducing “The New Chicago School” approach to regulation of behavior).
8. Lessig, supra note 7, at 661.
9. Id. at 666; see also Lawrence Lessig, Code Version 2.0 123 (2006) (noting regulatory
constraints of the law, social norms, the market, and architecture).
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different types of regulation. Part III evaluates more theoretical notions of
regulation, such as nudges and social norms, and how they might inform
us as to the proper strategy for effectively passing and implementing
effective regulatory approaches in our local environments. The Article
concludes that law is a workable tool to change individual behavior, and
major government action can influence social norms and create
improved infrastructure. Policymakers should use a combination of
strategies to facilitate effective change; for example, they should
rehabilitate traditional regulatory tools through initial nudging to allow
for stronger political outcomes. Local government should not fear
reliance on strong traditional regulation, or “pushes,” to get at individual
actions, despite the political challenges (such as, congestion pricing). In
general, society requires more forceful nudges than we have seen to date
in some areas, and, where this kind of push is not possible yet, we need to
lay the groundwork with some norm-shifting regulation that might be
more palatable politically or to the public. Infrastructure shifts can also
be a more successful type of intervention where more intrusive
regulation fails.

I. Regulatory Methods for Addressing Environmental and
Public Health Harms
There are multiple regulatory tools available for addressing
environmental and public health harms, or, for that matter, any resource
or commodity. As seen in Table 1 below, these regulatory methods
generally fall into six categories, providing a useful taxonomy as
policymakers assess the regulatory options available to them for abating
10
various environmental harms. The purpose in accounting for different
regulatory options is that “[l]aw can select among these various
techniques in selecting the end it wants to achieve. Which it selects
11
depends on the return from each.” It is important “to speak
comprehensively about these tools—about how they function together,
about how they interact, and about how law might affect their
12
influence.”

10. See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 319, 327 (2005)
(naming five regulatory methods); Czarnezki, supra note 2, at 3; see also Lessig, supra note 9, at 123
(noting regulatory constraints within law, social norms, economy, and architecture). See generally
David M. Driesen et al., Environmental Law: A Conceptual and Pragmatic Approach (2d ed.
2011) (assessing industry standards on regulatory mechanisms).
11. Lessig, supra note 7, at 672.
12. Id.
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Table 1: Regulatory Methods for Reducing Environmental and
Public Health Harms
Type
Standard-setting

Information
Bans
Market-based

Infrastructure
Public awareness and
pollution prevention

Also Known As
Technology-based
standards; healtheffects standards
Labeling; inventories
Prohibitions
Cost-benefit analysis,
economic incentives;
subsidies; taxes;
valuation of
ecosystem services
Architecture
Marketing
campaigns; voluntary
programs

Examples
National Ambient Air
Quality Standards
Toxic Release
Inventory
Plastic bag bans
Cap-and-trade
greenhouse gas
programs

Mass transit; parks
Composting and
recycling programs;
public service
advertisements

First, government regulations can set effects-based or technologybased standards, demanding that harms do not surpass a specific threshold
or requiring the use of certain technologies to reduce harm. This, to a
significant extent, is the “classical” type of regulation and traditional focus
of environmental law.
All environmental standards seek to reduce adverse effects in some
way. Effects-based environmental standards, often referred to as
“health-based” or “environment-based” standards, do so by expressly
determining the level of environmental quality deemed acceptable as a
goal. In establishing effects-based standards, we ask what level of
environmental quality is adequate, or necessary, to protect health or
environmental resources. The difficult part is deciding what is
13
“adequate.”

For example, the Clean Air Act requires that the Environmental
Protection Agency promulgate National Ambient Air Quality Standards
for criteria air pollutants which “in the judgment of the Administrator,
based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety, are
14
requisite to protect the public health.” Regulation can also require
agencies to set and regulate entities to meet standards that available (or
15
potentially available) technologies are capable of achieving. For

13. Driesen et al., supra note 10, at 127.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2013).
15. Driesen et al., supra note 10, at 192–96.
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example, when Congress passed the Clean Water Act, “it changed the
primary focus of federal law from the harm visited on the receiving water
16
stream segments to end-of-pipe, technology-based permit limits.”
“There is considerable debate . . . over the efficiency of prescriptive
17
regulations.” On the one hand, they may be “inefficient and unwieldy,”
providing “little incentive for innovation because once the regulated
party has satisfied the necessary requirement[s], the law creates no
18
incentive to reduce harmful activities further.” On the other hand,
environmental regulation may encourage production-process and design
19
innovations.
Second, the government may regulate through information generation
and labeling. Such information-based approaches can inform society about
environmental and public health harms. Providing information about the
environmental consequences of actions can encourage better performance
20
for government institutions, private entities, and individuals. The theory
behind informational approaches “is that the government can change
people’s behavior by forcing them to think about the harm they are
21
causing and by publicizing that harm.” Information both guides
government decisionmaking regarding how and whether to protect the
environment, and motivates private cleanup and avoidance of
22
environmental problems. Examples of informational regulation include
the Energy Star energy efficiency labeling program, the Toxic Release
Inventory, and the USDA Organic food labeling program. Informational
regulation can be useful when political will inhibits direct regulation, and
23
studies indicate that information can shape environmental norms. For
instance, increased awareness of consequences of individual transportation
24
behavior has a positive effect on willingness to reduce personal car use.
However, it can be costly to produce accurate and verifiable information,
and informational regulation does not require changes in consumer or
corporate behavior.
Third, regulation can simply impose bans on certain harms that are
unacceptable at any level. For example, in recent years, communities
have instituted bans on plastic bags and smoking in public places.

16. David Drelich, Restoring the Cornerstone of the Clean Water Act, 34 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 267,
304 (2009).
17. James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental Law: The Five P’s,
3 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 363, 365 (2013).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Driesen et al., supra note 10, at 329–30.
21. Salzman, supra note 17, at 373.
22. Driesen et al., supra note 10, at 329–31.
23. Salzman, supra note 17, at 373.
24. Annika M. Nordlund & Jörgen Garvill, Effects of Values, Problem Awareness, and Personal
Norm on Willingness to Reduce Personal Car Use, 23 J. Envtl. Psychol. 339, 345 (2003).
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Internationally, for example, signatories of the Stockholm Convention on
Persistent Organic Pollutants, to which the United States is not a party,
agreed to outlaw “chemical substances that persist in the environment,
bioaccumulate through the food web, and pose a risk of causing adverse
25
effects to human health and the environment.”
Fourth, society can pursue market-based regulation that considers
cost-benefit analysis, economic incentives (such as, subsidies), economic
disincentives (such as, taxes), and valuation of ecosystem services.
“[M]arket-based approaches, such as pollution charges and trading of
pollution permits/credits, attempt to harness market forces to achieve
equal or greater amounts of pollution control than prescriptive
26
regulation in a more cost-efficient manner.” The European Union capand-trade permitting system, “a cornerstone of the European Union’s
policy to combat climate change and its key tool for reducing industrial
27
greenhouse gas emissions cost-effectively,” is one such example.
Market-based approaches, while currently popular, may prove
challenging to implement. To the extent privatization is required,
“environmental resources are not easily amenable to commodification,”
and “normative concerns . . . rub against privatization of . . .
28
environmental amenities in the public domain.” Financial penalties
(such as, charges and taxes), however, increase the cost of polluting
activities by discouraging pollution and waste and forcing the polluter to
29
bear the costs of her activities. The challenges to this type of regulation
include setting an appropriate penalty price and overcoming the political
30
aversion to financial penalties and taxes. Rather than a stick, the
financial payment can also function as a carrot in the form of payment or
subsidy. Thus, one solution for the unpalatability problem for behaviormodifying regulation is to choose carrots versus sticks based on the level of
public palatability of the regulation.
Fifth, governments at all levels, sometimes with the financial support
of private entities, can spend money on infrastructure that improves
environmental outcomes including mass transit, bike lanes, and public
parks. Admittedly, such infrastructure is not “regulation” per se but to
ignore its importance, in terms of both expense and the ability to shift

25. POPS—Persistent Organic Pollutants, Eur. Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pops/
(last updated Apr. 22, 2015).
26. Jerold S. Kayden, Market-Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of
Environmental and Land Use Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 565, 565
(1992).
27. The EU Emissions Trading System, Eur. Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/
index_en.htm (last updated May 5, 2015).
28. Salzman, supra note 17, at 368.
29. Id. at 370.
30. Id. at 371.
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social norms, would be to leave a gap in any analysis for what approach
might best alleviate the problems of an environmental harm.
Sixth, public awareness (that is, marketing campaigns) and pollution
prevention (that is, recycling and composting programs) are regulatory
tools that can often prove cheaper than end-of-the-pipe controls and lead
31
to voluntary action.
Again, the challenge is in determining which of the available
regulatory tools will best abate the environmental or public health harm.
And even if we can agree that emissions of a particular pollutant are
too high, that grazing levels of the local commons must be reduced, or
that a local endangered species requires greater protection, a
fundamental choice still remains: We need to decide how best to
achieve these goals.
Put another way, even if we agree on our starting point and end point,
we still need to determine which path should take us there. Reliance
on regulatory mandates? Market instruments? Pilot projects or
information generation? Implementing environmental policy is where
the rubber meets the road, and it has provided some of the most
32
innovative policy instruments in all of American law.

How have such decisions been made in New York City? Have they
been successful?

II. “New York City Rules!”
PlaNYC is a strategic vision for the public health and environmental
welfare of New York City and lays the basic groundwork for many of the
initiatives discussed in this Article. This Part describes the wide variety of
environmental and public health initiatives pursued by New York City in
recent years, providing a broad overview of New York City initiatives as
a whole with a greater focus on overall goals.
It seems that not a week went by without another “crazy” initiative
coming out of New York City. The headlines speak for themselves:
 Bloomberg’s Parting Gift for NYC: Mandatory Composting
 For Bloomberg and Bike-Sharing Program, the Big Moment
34
Arrives
 Detroit’s Richard Bernstein to NYC Mayor Bloomberg: Big Gulps
35
Don’t Hurt People, Bicycles Do
33

31. See Driesen et al., supra note 10, at 378–80.
32. Salzman, supra note 17, at 363.
33. Margaret Hartmann, Bloomberg’s Parting Gift for NYC: Mandatory Composting, N.Y. Mag.
(June 16, 2013, 11:24 PM), http:nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/bloombergs-parting-giftmandatory-composting.html.
34. Matt Flegenheimer, For Bloomberg and Bike-Sharing Program, the Big Moment Arrives, N.Y.
Times, May 27, 2013, at A13.
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 Mayor Bloomberg’s Food Composting Edict Could Create a
36
Manhattan Feast—For Rats
 Mayor Bloomberg Strikes Again—And This Time He’s Trying
37
to Regulate . . . Trash
38
 Big Apple “Voluntary” Composting Idea Stinks
39
 Congestion Pricing: The Road to the Surveillance State
 Here They Go Again: Nanny Bloomberg’s Obsession with
40
Soda

This list of headlines is just the tip of the iceberg. The New York City
41
Council and Mayor Bloomberg, not without criticism, pursued a variety
of ambitious public health and environmental regulations to improve the
city’s quality of life. Some of these regulations, like congestion pricing,
experienced failure, while others were perceived as successes, like smoking
regulation. Meanwhile, others, like the ban on large sugary drinks and the
installation of Citi Bike, received widespread press. These categories of
regulations are not mutually exclusive. These New York City rules, both
those proposed and actually implemented, include bans (foam containers,
sugary drinks, smoking in public spaces, trans fat, displaying tobacco
products); informational regulation (displaying food calorie information);
education (marketing campaign about dangers of excess drinking);
infrastructure (salad bars in schools, public space recycling, bike lanes,
tree planting); pollution prevention (e-waste recycling); standard-setting
(energy efficient building standards); and economic (dis)incentives
(congestion pricing). These specific New York City initiatives match the

35. Gus Burns, Detroit’s Richard Bernstein to NYC Mayor Bloomberg: Big Gulps Don’t Hurt People,
Bicycles Do, MLive Media Group (Apr. 5, 2013, 7:43 AM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/
2013/04/detroits_richard_bernstein_to.html.
36. Jennifer Harper, Mayor Bloomberg’s Food Composting Edict Could Create a Manhattan
Feast—For Rats, Wash. Times (June 18, 2013, 8:41 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/
watercooler/2013/jun/18/mayor-bloombergs-food-composting-edict-could-creat/.
37. Liz Klimas, Mayor Bloomberg Strikes Again — And This Time He’s Trying to Regulate…
Trash, Blaze (June 17, 2013, 8:49 AM), http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/06/17/
mayor-bloomberg-strikes-again-and-this-time-hes-trying-to-regulate-trash/.
38. Jeff Stier, Big Apple “Voluntary” Composting Idea Stinks, Hum. Events (June 21, 2013, 6:00
AM), http://humanevents.com/2013/06/21/big-apple-composting-idea-stinks/.
39. Becky Akers, Congestion Pricing: The Road to the Surveillance State, Freeman: Ideas on
Liberty, Jan. 1, 2008, at 18.
40. Here They Go Again: Nanny Bloomberg’s Obsession with Soda, Am. Beverage Assoc. (May
31, 2012), http://www.ameribev.org/blog/2012/05/headline-–-here-they-go-again-nanny-bloomberg’sobsession-with-soda/.
41. See Jim Dwyer, The Impossible Mayor of the Possible, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 2013, at MB4
(“He led the country—indeed, the world—in taking strong measures to reduce carbon emissions,
anticipating that the city’s population would grow by one million in the decade after he left office;
meanwhile, he flew everywhere on private jets, the least carbon-efficient form of transportation on or
above the earth, whether going to spend weekends at his house in Bermuda, or to lecture at a climate
change conference in Copenhagen.”).
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taxonomy described in Table 1 above. Although, as seen in Table 2
below, many others could have been discussed in greater detail.
Table 2: New York City Examples of Regulatory Approaches
Type
42
Standard-setting
Information
Bans

Market-based
Infrastructure
Public awareness and pollution
prevention

New York City Examples
43
Green zoning
Menu calories information
Sugary drinks; vending machines
in schools; smoking or tobacco;
styrofoam
Congestion pricing
Citi Bike; salad bars in schools
Composting; recycling programs

Due to the sheer number of initiatives proposed by the audacious
PlaNYC and proposed by New York City public officials, this Part,
through its discussion of the various categories of environmental and public
health reform, focuses in particular on initiatives in urban transportation
and food systems that generated serious public discussion. Five examples
of the regulatory approaches to be explored include (1) the market-based
congestion pricing plan for Lower Manhattan (passage of which failed);
(2) the Citi Bike infrastructure; (3) the proposed “Sugary Drink” ban; (4)
the informational calorie labeling on food menus; and (5) the emerging
compost pollution prevention plan.
A. PlaNYC and GreeNYC
In light of global environmental problems with no forthcoming
international or national solutions, “local environmental law” has
proliferated in an attempt to improve quality of life for individuals and
their communities while simultaneously seeking to address global
environmental concerns. Such “local environmental law” often pursues such
change through the regulation of individual behavior and activities
associated with living our daily lives.

42. I did not analyze a New York City initiative from the “standard-setting” category as this is the
most traditional form of regulation as opposed to the alternative forms of regulation now being
pursued by local governments.
43. On April 30, 2012, the New York City Council adopted the Zone Green Amendments. They
feature modifications to zoning for energy efficient walls, sun control devices, solar and wind energy,
rooftop greenhouses. See Zone Green, N.Y.C. Council (Apr. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/pdf/greenbuildings/adopted_text_amendment.pdf; see also Mireya
Navarro, New York Plans Greener Zoning Rules, N.Y. Times (Dec. 20, 2011, 4:09 PM),
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/20/new-york-plans-greener-zoning-rules/.
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Consistent with the increased focus on local environmental action,
on Earth Day 2007, New York Mayor Bloomberg unveiled PlaNYC, an
“environmental blueprint” containing more than 100 initiatives for a
44
greener city.
Some individual cities have been especially proactive. New York has
won considerable recognition for its long-term growth and sustainability
plan, PlaNYC 2030. This aims to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions by
30% from 2005 levels over the next 20 years—roughly the same as the
US federal government’s goal of reducing the country’s emissions by
28% from 2005 levels by 2020. Because nearly 80% of New York City
emissions come from buildings, the New York plan includes compulsory
energy audits of city and commercial buildings of more than 4,645
45
square metres (50,000 square feet).

PlaNYC is a comprehensive strategic plan for the greater New York City
46
area. A revised version of the plan was published in April 2011. The
202-page plan, published by the city of New York and Mayor
Bloomberg, lays out a general plan and specific initiatives in ten
particular areas: housing and neighborhoods; parks and public spaces;
brownfields; waterways; water supply; transportation; energy; air quality;
47
solid waste; and climate change.
PlaNYC embraces large-scale changes in infrastructure and policy,
and supports smaller scale action, as evinced by GreeNYC. GreeNYC is
a program and website “dedicated to helping New Yorkers rise to the
challenge of making our city greener and greater” by “reducing their
energy use, choosing a more sustainable lifestyle, and taking small
actions that will help shrink the citywide carbon footprint and improve
48
environmental quality.” It is a classic example of public awareness
marketing that encourages New Yorkers to live more sustainable lives
and offering tips to do so. For example, the website uses a mascot,
“Birdie,” to promote green lifestyle tips for home, work, and travel, such
49
as fully loading the dishwasher and using natural light at work.
PlaNYC itself addresses the basic overview of the specific initiatives
proposed by Mayor Bloomberg and discussed in this Article. In
promoting congestion pricing, a PlaNYC report states that “[t]o reduce
congestion on our roads, bridges, and airports we will pilot technology

44. Mireya Navarro, Mayor’s Environmental Record: Grand Plans and Small Steps Forward, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 23, 2009, at A32.
45. Cynthia Rosenzweig et al., Comment, Cities Lead the Way in Climate-Change Action,
467 Nature 909, 910 (2010).
46. See City of N.Y., PlaNYC Update 2011, A Greener, Greater New York (2011), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/planyc_2011_planyc_full_report.pdf.
47. Id. at 170.
48. About GreeNYC, GreeNYC, http://www.nyc.gov/html/greenyc/html/about/about.shtml (last
visited Aug. 5, 2015).
49. Id.
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and pricing-based mechanisms,” and that “[t]ools like pricing and
intelligent transportation systems technology enable us to better manage
physically constrained assets by encouraging drivers to shift their trips
51
away from the most congested travel times.”
Bike-sharing in New York City, now known as Citi Bike, is also
heavily promoted. “Continued expansion of the bike network, initiatives
for bike parking, education, and implementation of a bike-sharing
program will be needed to offer this alternative to more New Yorkers
and achieve our goal of doubling bicycle commuting from 2007 levels by
52
2012 and tripling it by 2017.” The Plan lays out some future details as
well.
Through bike-sharing, bicycles are made available to riders at kiosks
for a small fee. When Paris installed its bike-sharing program, cycling
quadrupled in one year. Bike-sharing will enable New Yorkers and
visitors to check out bikes for short trips for a nominal cost, or for free
if the trip is fewer than 30 minutes. We will partner with a third-party
53
operator to establish a robust bike-sharing program in the city.

The Plan goes to great lengths to sing the praises of bike-sharing in the
world cities of Western Europe.
Bike-sharing makes it easy to get around and eliminates the need to
find bike parking. Users can take a bike from one kiosk and drop it off
at another. New York, like London, is a dense, multi-modal city, and
New Yorkers and visitors alike would benefit from traveling across the
city on two wheels. By 2012, New Yorkers will be able to get an annual
membership to a bike-sharing program for less than the cost of a
54
monthly MetroCard.

However, not all PlaNYC initiatives are handled and implemented
with such detail. For example, trash presents an enormous problem for
New York City. Composting is a clear path to improvement, but laying
out the problem and recognizing the need for a solution is far different
than actually devising a way to compost the organic waste of over
8 million New York City residents and businesses. The basic goal is lofty.
To reduce the amount of organic material we send to landfills, we will
expand opportunities for community-based composting and encourage
commercial food waste recovery operations. Advances in technology
will also allow us to pursue alternative disposal methods by safely and
55
efficiently converting our waste into a source of clean energy.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

PlaNYC, supra note 46, at 91.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 94–95.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 137.
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But existing opportunities for composting are nearly absent, except for a
few noble community-run programs. For example, New York’s sanitation
56
operations pale in comparison to San Francisco’s Recology Program.
New Yorkers have several options to compost their food waste. Many
community-based organizations accept food waste for small-scale
composting. GrowNYC hosts drop-off locations for organics at select
Greenmarkets, and residents with yards can use small containers to
compost kitchen scraps along with their yard waste. For nearly 18
years, the City has also operated the NYC Compost Project, which
offers outreach and education about composting for residents, nonprofit organizations, and businesses at botanical gardens and non57
profits in each borough.

Since a curbside composting collection pilot program in the early 1990s
was deemed inefficient and costly, an efficient composting program model
58
has yet to be developed for New York City.
B. New York City Transportation
Given the significant traffic congestion, especially in Lower
Manhattan, the City of New York pursued a number of transportation
initiatives during the Bloomberg mayoral administration. Ideas and
59
proposals to confront the congestion problem included bike parking,
60
61
hybrid taxicabs, car-sharing, creating more bicycle lanes, an ill-fated
62
anti-idling ordinance, and banning cars in Central Park during the summer.
The mayor fought a war of attrition with the automobile. He sought to
transform bicycling from a recreational activity into a real alternative
to cars. By 2013, the city had added about 450 miles of bike lanes
carved mostly from the city’s roadways. Some curbs and medians were
installed to separate pedalers from cars, but many of the lanes were

56. See Residential Recycling, Composting and Trash Services, Recology, http://www.sfrecycling.com/
index.php/for-homes/residential-recycling-compost-trash (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
57. PlaNYC, supra note 46, at 140 (“We will expand outreach and education efforts, benchmark
and quantify current community-based composting efforts, and work with community and government
partners to increase the number of available drop-off locations for food waste. In addition, we will
launch a grant program for small-scale composting to encourage diversion of food waste.”).
58. Id. at 141 (“The City piloted curbside collection for organics in the early 1990s and found that
while it did increase diversion rates in lower-density neighborhoods, it was not a cost-effective
collection method. Although the disposal costs were lower for organics than refuse, each collection
truck only picked up a small amount of organics on their route, which resulted in a high collection cost
per ton. Since 20 years have passed, we will reexamine this issue and complete a new study to
determine the feasibility of curbside organics recycling.”).
59. Zoning for Bicycle ParkingApproved!, N.Y.C. Planning, http://www.nyc.gov/html/dcp/html/
bicycle_parking/index.shtml (last updated Apr. 22, 2009).
60. Press Release, City of N.Y., Mayor Bloomberg Announces Taxi Fleet to Be Fully Hybrid by
2012 (May 22, 2007).
61. Car Share Zoning Text AmendmentApproved!, N.Y.C. Planning, http://www.nyc.gov/html/
dcp/html/car_share/index.shtml (last updated Sept. 29, 2010).
62. Matt Flegenheimer, City to Close 2 Drives in Central Park Through Labor Day, N.Y. Times,
July 4, 2013, at A22.
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demarcated simply with painted asphalt, much as blue paint divided
automobiles from pedestrians along sections of Times Square and
Broadway. Mr. Bloomberg lost his most ambitious offensive against
cars when the State Legislature defeated his plan for “congestion
pricing” in 2008, but he doubled down on biking with a popular bike63
sharing system this year.

The following Subpart discusses two of the more controversial
initiatives. First, it discusses Citi Bike, the newly implemented and fastgrowing bike-sharing program, and second, it discusses Manhattan’s
congestion pricing plan that ultimately failed.
1. Citi Bike
New York City engaged in a significant infrastructure initiative with
its Citi Bike program. As a result, the summer of 2013 was when bicycles
64
took over New York City. The genesis of the program began earlier,
though with significant speed considering the size of the city. On
November 23, 2010, the New York City Department of Transportation
released a Request for Proposals (“RFP”) to private companies to fund a
65
City Bike Share System. The RFP called for a single private company to
fund the program entirely for the first five years while sharing profits
66
with the city.
On September 14, 2011, Transportation Commissioner Janette
Sadik-Khan announced the selection of Alta Bicycle Share to run the
67
bike-share program. Citi Bike is now operated by NYC Bike Share,
68
LLC, a subsidiary of Motivate. Alta, along with the Public Bike System
Company, operate bike-share systems in Washington, D.C., Boston,
69
Melbourne, Chattanooga, Toronto, Seattle, Arlington, and Columbus.
Citibank paid $41 million to be the lead sponsor of the initiative for five
70
years.

63. Ford Fessenden et al., Turf War Over Asphalt in The Bloomberg Years: Reshaping New York,
N.Y. Times, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/08/18/reshaping-new-york/.
64. James Hamblin, The Summer Bicycles Took Control, Atlantic, (June 28, 2013, 10:33 AM),
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/06/the-summer-bicycles-took-control/277166/. I note
that there may be a renewed interest in bicycle planning infrastructure for cities. See Ryan Seher,
Comment, I Want to Ride My Bicycle: Why and How Cities Plan for Bicycle Infrastructure, 59 Buff. L.
Rev. 585, 586–87 (2001).
65. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Transp., NYC DOT Seeks Proposals for a City Bike Share
System (Nov. 23, 2010), http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/html/pr2010/pr10_060.shtml.
66. Id.
67. Ben Fried, NYC Chooses Alta to Operate Bike-Share System with 10,000 Bikes, StreetsBlog
NYC (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.streetsblog.org/2011/09/14/nyc-chooses-alta-to-operate-bike-sharesystem-with-10000-bikes/.
68. About Citi Bike, Citi Bike NYC, http://citibikenyc.com/about (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
69. Id.
70. Matt Flegenheimer, Citibank Pays to Put Name on Shared Bikes, N.Y. Times (May 7, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/nyregion/new-york-cycle-sharing-gets-a-name-citi-bike.html.
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Citi Bike was initially set to open in July of 2012, as specified in its
71
contract with Motivate. However, on August 17, 2012, Mayor
Bloomberg and the Transportation Department announced that due to
software issues Citi Bike would not open until March of 2013 with 7000
72
bikes and 420 stations. The system initially aimed to have 10,000 bikes
73
and 600 stations expanding into the Upper East and West Sides, Long
74
Island City, Sunnyside, Park Slope, Cobble Hill, and Crown Heights.
Citi Bike opened on May 27, 2013 for annual members; all other
75
users were allowed to use the system one week later. The Citi Bike
bicycle-share network achieved “high enrollment (two million trips in its
first seventy-six days) and extremely low injury rates (eight during the
76
same period).” Starting April 15, 2013, riders could sign up online in
order to receive their Citi Bike key before opening day; the first 5000
77
people received a “founding member” key. Annual membership fee is
$95, or approximately twenty-five cents per day for unlimited rides of
78
forty-five minutes or less. When the system opened, it immediately
became the largest bike share system in the country, with 6000 bikes and
79
330 stations. The service area on opening day included Manhattan
below 59th street, Brooklyn Heights, DUMBO, Fort Greene, Clinton
80
Hill, and Bedford Stuyvesant.
A poll on August 16, 2012 showed that seventy-four percent of New
81
Yorkers thought that a bike-share program was a good idea, and, as
discussed in Part III below, New Yorkers remain positive about Citi
Bike. That said, the New York City Department of Transportation
(“DOT”) has received various complaints, mostly in the form of

71. Matt Flegenheimer, Bike Share Delayed Until Spring, Mayor Says, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/18/nyregion/bike-share-program-delayed-until-spring-bloomberg-says.html.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Mayor Bloomberg and Transportation Commissioner Sadik-khan Launch Citi Bike, New York’s
Newest Transportation Option and the Nation’s Largest Bike Share System, City of N.Y. (May 27, 2013),
http://www1.nyc.gov/office-of-the-mayor/news/178-13/mayor-bloomberg-transportation-commissionersadik-khan-launch-citi-bike-new-york-s-newest.
75. NYC DOT and NYC Bike Share Announce Citi Bike to Begin May 27, Bloomberg (May 8,
2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/article/2013-05-09/ahgGxlSMzBVw.html.
76. Bill Millard, Challenging Motorism in New York City, 13 Contexts 32, 33 (2014).
77. Stephen Miller, Sadik-Khan, Wolfson Invite New Yorkers to Sign Up for Bike-Share,
StreetsBlog NYC (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.streetsblog.org/2013/04/15/sadik-khan-wolfson-rideciti-bike-encourage-new-yorkers-to-sign-up/.
78. Matt Flegenheimer, Out for a First Spin: City’s Bike Share Program Begins, N.Y. Times (May
27, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/nyregion/bike-share-program-opens-in-new-york-cityafter-long-delay.html.
79. Id.
80. NYC DOT, supra note 75.
81. Ben Fried, Q Poll: 74 Percent of New Yorkers Think Bike-Share Is a Good Idea, StreetsBlog
NYC (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.streetsblog.org/2012/08/16/q-poll-74-percent-of-new-yorkers-thinkbike-share-is-a-good-idea/.
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82

NIMBY-esque reactions to kiosk placement. Washington Park residents,
while not opposed to the bike-share system itself, complained the Citi
Bike kiosks, with their conspicuous Citi logos, stood in stark contrast to
83
the neighborhood’s historic character.
One particularly controversial kiosk in SoHo’s Petrosino Square
84
sparked protests from both the Parks Department and local artists. The
Parks Department claimed that a large thirty-two-bike kiosk was
inappropriate for the relatively small park, and artists complained that
85
the kiosk would interrupt art displays and performances in the Square.
New York City bicycle rental shops are divided on Citi Bike’s
86
impact on their businesses. Some rental businesses report higher
ridership inspired by Citi Bike and insist that Citi Bike, which is designed
for short trips, does not compete with companies built upon bike
87
touring. Other shops reported that rentals decreased by fifty percent
88
from last summer. Long-term effects remain to be seen.
The tabloid paper New York Post has been particularly critical of
the program, highlighting stories such as a software glitch at a kiosk
89
outside of Grand Central Station and a rider suffering from a flat tire.
Also, a New York Daily News reporter gave the bikes a negative review,
strangely criticizing the slow speed and “sturd[iness]” of the bikes while
90
acknowledging the reasons for these design features. Despite the
criticisms and glitches, ridership is increasing; on August 6, 2013, Citi
91
Bike averaged over seven rides per bike. In comparison, London has
92
never surpassed six rides per bike.

82. NIMBY stands for “Not-In-My-Back-Yard.”
83. Michelle Manetti, Washington Park Residents: Bike Share Is an Affront to ‘History’ (June 8,
2012, 3:11 PM), http://fort-greene.thelocal.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/washington-park-residents-bikeshare-location-is-wheely-bad/.
84. Pete Donohue et al., Transportation Department’s Bike-Docking Station at Petrosino Square
Sparks Protests, N.Y. Daily News (May 9, 2013, 12:34 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/newyork/bike-share-registrations-roll-article-1.1339319.
85. Id.
86. Alex Goldmark, Does Citi Bike Hurt or Help Local Bike Rental Companies?, WNYC (Aug. 5,
2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/transportation-nation/2013/aug/05/does-citi-bike-hurt-orhelp-local-bike-rental-companies/.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Yasmine Phillips & Antonio Antenucci, An Endless Cycle of Problems for Citi Bike Share
Program, N.Y. Post (June 3, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://nypost.com/2013/06/03/an-endless-cycle-ofproblems-for-citi-bike-share-program/.
90. Simone Weichselbaum, Our Bike Snob Tests out the CitiBike—and Finds It a Weighty Chore,
N.Y. Daily News (May 12, 2013, 5:10 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/news-reporterrides-citibike-article-1.1342004.
91. Brad Aaron, Citi Bike Cracked Seven Trips Per Bike Yesterday (That’s a Lot), StreetsBlog
NYC (Aug. 7, 2013), http://www.streetsblog.org/2013/08/07/citi-bike-cracked-seven-trips-per-bikeyesterday-thats-a-lot/.
92. Id.
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To complement Citi Bike with further infrastructure, Bloomberg
93
has added over 255 miles of bike lanes throughout his term as mayor.
The DOT is still actively constructing new bike lanes and has announced
94
concrete plans for several new routes uptown. In a New York Times
poll, conducted in August of 2012, sixty-six percent of New Yorkers
95
thought that bike lanes were a good idea. Concern over reduced onstreet parking appears to be the primary argument against bike lane
96
expansion.
All of the 2013 mayoral candidates had either remained silent on
97
bike lanes or expressed interest in removing some of the lanes. Candidate
Christine Quinn stated that the bike lane issue was polarizing such that it
98
is “in the category of things you shouldn’t discuss at dinner parties.”
New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio, elected in 2014, favors the bike
lanes and promotes their expansion.
2.

Congestion Pricing

Congestion pricing fits into the market-based regulatory category
discussed above, and has been often discussed as an option to improve
quality of life and lessen traffic in Manhattan. Manhattan, particularly
south of 60th Street, is New York City’s commercial heart and
experiences an exceedingly high volume of motor vehicle traffic
negatively impacting air quality, public safety, commerce, and traffic
99
flow. According to PlaNYC, congestion costs the city $13 billion per
100
year in lost economic output. Thus, to improve quality of life and
reduce traffic congestion, Mayor Bloomberg and New York City
proposed a congestion pricing initiative for Manhattan. Ultimately, the
plan was defeated by the New York State legislature, and, as of the
publication of this Article, no congestion pricing plan has been
implemented in New York City. This “ambitious federally-funded local
initiative to reduce vehicle congestion . . . failed due to political

93. Michael M. Grynbaum & Marjorie Connelly, Bicycle Lanes Draw Wide Support Among City
Residents, Survey Says, N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 2012, at A20.
94. Michael J. Feeney et al., City DOT Has a Plan for New Bike Lanes Uptown, But Some Residents
and Merchants Oppose It, N.Y. Daily News (May 29, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/
new-york/uptown/uptown-bike-lane-proposal-unpopular-residents-merchants-article-1.1357003.
95. Grynbaum & Connelly, supra note 93.
96. Feeney et al., supra note 94.
97. Matt Flegenheimer, Anxiety Over Future of Bike Lanes, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 2013, at A22.
98. Id.
99. PlaNYC, supra note 48, at 95; see also Michael Kogut, What Went Wrong: A Legal
Perspective of Congestion Pricing in New York City, 7 Dartmouth L.J. 88, 89 (2009). In 2009, an
average 686,549 motor vehicles entered or left the Central Business District (“CBD”) on any given
day. N.Y. Metro. Transp. Council, HUB Bound Travel Report 2009, at 1–15 (2011), available
at http://www.nymtc.org/files/hub_bound/2009_HUB_BOUND_REPORT.pdf.
100. PlaNYC, supra note 46, at 95.
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101

complications,” even though economists have called congestion pricing
102
the “single most viable approach to reducing traffic congestion.”
“Federal funding has been made available for urban centers through
[U.S. DOT’s] Congestion Initiative, which sponsored the 2007 Urban
Partnership Agreement to help fund select” cities’ implementation
103
strategies for reducing congestion. New York City’s congestion pricing
scheme was one of the transportation bullet points announced on April
104
22, 2007 as part of Bloomberg’s PlaNYC. It was meant to alleviate
105
congestion in the Central Business District (“CBD”).
On April 22, 2007 (Earth Day), Mayor Bloomberg unveiled his
PlaNYC which, among other greenhouse gas-reducing initiatives,
spotlighted a three-year pilot congestion pricing program to cover all of
Manhattan south of 86th Street. According to 2007 PlaNYC, the
congestion pricing program would work as follows:
Passenger vehicles entering or leaving Manhattan below 86th
Street during the business day (weekdays 6 am to 6 pm)—with the
exception of the FDR Drive, the West Side Highway, and West
Street—would pay an $8 daily fee. Trucks would pay $21. Autos that
drive only within “the Zone” would pay half price. The charge would
apply to all vehicles, except emergency vehicles, those with
handicapped license plates, taxis, and for-hire vehicles (radio cars).
Vehicles using E-Z Pass that travel through MTA or Port
Authority (PA) tolled crossings on the same day would pay only the
difference between their MTA or PA tolls and the congestion charge,
so that drivers don’t have an incentive to detour across free bridges.
Because roads on the periphery of Manhattan will not be in the Zone,
trips around the Zone (for example, from Harlem to Brooklyn) would
106
not be charged.

Due to the political failure discussed below, congestion pricing was removed
entirely from the 2011 PlaNYC.
Criticism of Mayor Bloomberg’s plan, as one might expect, was
significant, including complaints that the plan was unfair to lower-income
individuals that travel by car into Manhattan or that border areas (such
as, north of 86th Street or Brooklyn) would become virtual parking

101. Sam Schwartz et al., A Comprehensive Transportation Policy for the 21st Century: A Case
Study of Congestion Pricing in New York City, 17 N.Y.U. Envtl. L.J. 580, 581 (2008).
102. Kogut, supra note 99, at 89.
103. Schwartz et al., supra note 101, at 589.
104. Press Release, City of N.Y., Mayor Bloomberg Presents PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New
York (Apr. 22, 2007).
105. Id.
106. City of N.Y., PlaNYC: A Greener, Greater New York 89 (2007), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc/downloads/pdf/publications/full_report_2007.pdf; see also Schwartz et
al., supra note 101, at 594 n.25.
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107

lots.
Some New York City residents found congestion pricing
“insan[e]” or “appalling” right from the beginning, particularly those
108
commuting within the boundaries of their own hometown.
“On June 22, 2007, the New York City Department of
Transportation, New York Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and
the New York State Department of Transportation submitted a proposal
109
to the DOT’s Urban Partnership Program.” “[T]he federal government
then selected New York City’s proposal, and agreed to commit over three
110
hundred and fifty million dollars to fund congestion pricing.”
The mayor was required, under both state law and the agreement
with the U.S. DOT, to garner enough political support for state approval
because “[w]ithout State approval, New York City could not receive
111
UPA support.” In the summer of 2007, pursuant to state legislation, the
governor and state legislature formed the independent New York City
112
The
Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission (“Commission”).
Commission was charged with evaluating different congestion pricing
proposals, including PlaNYC, and to submit a comprehensive traffic
mitigation plan by January 2008 that would reduce vehicles miles traveled

107. Some called the plan inequitable, targeting the poor that commute by car into Manhattan,
although very few lower-income people travel by car into Manhattan thanks to New York City’s
extensive transit system.
108. Andy Newman, Outside Manhattan, Many Oppose Congestion Plan, N.Y. Times (June 9,
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/nyregion/09congestion.html.
109. Kogut, supra note 99, at 92–93; see also U.S. Dep’t of Transp., Urban Partnership
Agreement by and Between U.S. Department of Transportation and Its New York City Urban
Partner
(Aug.
8,
2007),
available
at
https://www.dot.ny.gov/programs/repository/
Appendix%20B%20Urban%20Parternship%20Agreement.pdf.
110. Kogut, supra note 99, at 93; see also William Neuman, New York to Get U.S. Traffic Aid, but with
Catch, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/15/nyregion/15congestion.html
(describing the restrictions on the use of the funding). Additionally, the U.S. Department of
Transportation accepted proposals from Miami, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Seattle. Id.
111. Schwartz, supra note 101, at 594; see also Kogut, supra note 99, at 91 (“Notwithstanding the
constitutional and statutory authorization to regulate its streets, the City lacks the ability to ‘pass,
enforce or maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation requiring from any owner of a motor vehicle or
motorcycle . . . any . . . fee . . . for the use of the public highways.’ Given this lack of authority, the City
is dependent upon a delegation of authority from the Legislature to charge vehicles a fee to enter the
congested core of Manhattan (or implement congestion pricing).”). But see Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
NYC Doesn’t Need Albany’s Permission to Enact Congestion Pricing, StreetsBlog NYC (July 16,
2012), http://www.streetsblog.org/2012/07/16/nyc-doesnt-need-albanys-permission-to-enact-congestionpricing/ (arguing that the city already has the right to pursue congestion pricing without State approval
under section 1642(a)(4) of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law, which grants cities with one
million or more people the right to impose “tolls, taxes, [and] fees . . . for the use of the highway or any
of its parts where the imposition thereof is authorized by law,” and that as long as the City Council
enacts a local law defining the toll, the city may pass a congestion pricing scheme independent of
Albany).
112. 2007 N.Y. Laws Ch. 384; see also Kogut, supra note 99, at 93–94.
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(“VMT”) south of 86th by 6.3% (the same figure as Bloomberg’s plan).
The congestion pricing plan passed the Commission by a thirteen-to-two
114
vote.
On January 31, 2008, the Commission released its final
recommendation for a congestion pricing plan similar to the one
proposed by Mayor Bloomberg, but slightly scaled back with a northern
border at 60th Street, an elimination of intra-zonal charges, and several
115
other provisions.
The Commission’s proposed plan would have changed the northern
boundary to 60th Street, and charged cars $8 for inbound trips only
116
during the same hours. Regular trucks would still be charged $21, but
117
low-emission trucks would pay only $7. Drivers would pay only once
118
during the day and could make unlimited trips in and out of the zone.
Drivers would be charged through E-ZPass, with a $1 surcharge for non119
E-ZPass users to encourage its use. The plan expected to generate
$491 million per year and was met with significant support from many
120
progressive organizations.
On March 31, 2008, the City Council approved the congestion
pricing bill (with the Commission modifications), passing by a slim
121
margin of thirty to twenty. At the time, the plan enjoyed the support of
122
Governor David Paterson and Senate Majority Leader Joseph Bruno,
123
but was questioned by Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver.
The Plan died in the New York State Assembly on April 7, 2008
124
behind closed doors. “[D]espite [significant] public support . . . (final

113. Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission Recommends Congestion Pricing Plan for New
York City, Green Car Congress (Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.greencarcongress.com/2008/01/trafficcongest.html.
114. William Neuman, State Commission Approves a Plan for Congestion Pricing, N.Y. Times
(Feb. 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/nyregion/01congest.html.
115. Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission, supra note 113.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Diane Cardwell, City Council Approves Fee to Drive Below 60th, N.Y. Times (Apr. 1, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/01/nyregion/01congestion.html. The Commission’s Recommended
Implementation Plan is what the City Council voted on. See City of N.Y. Dep’t of Transp., Report to
the Traffic Congestion Mitigation Commission and Recommended Implementation Plan (Jan. 31,
2008), available at https://www.dot.ny.gov/programs/repository/TCMC-Final-Report.pdf.
122. Diane Cardwell, Paterson Supports Congestion Pricing, N.Y. Times (Mar. 22, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/22/nyregion/22congestion.html.
123. Cardwell, supra note 121.
124. Nicholas Confessore, $8 Traffic Fee for Manhattan Gets Nowhere, N.Y. Times (Apr. 8, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/08/nyregion/08congest.html (quoting Assembly Speaker Silver as
saying, “[t]he congestion pricing bill did not have anywhere near a majority of the Democratic
conference, and will not be on the floor of the Assembly”); see also Kogut, supra note 99, at 95.
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polls showed New York City voter support at sixty-seven percent and
statewide support at sixty percent if the revenue was funneled to transit),
125
the Assembly defeated the measure with a non-vote.” There was
widespread opposition from Democratic members of the Assembly, most
notably those from Queens, Brooklyn, and New York City suburbs “who
viewed the proposed congestion fee as a regressive measure that
126
overwhelmingly benefitted affluent Manhattanites.” The Democrats in
Assembly refused to put the bill to a public vote, despite then-Governor
127
Paterson’s last-minute efforts to save the plan, and despite the
overwhelming support of congestion pricing by scholars and
128
policymakers.
“As a result, the UPA money was redirected to Chicago and Los
Angeles (with the addition of Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 funds) to fund plans
129
less ambitious than New York’s.” New York was meant to receive
130
$354.5 million in federal funding to reduce traffic. As a condition, the
city would have to contribute $200 million for the congestion pricing
131
scheme itself. As of April 2008, $153 million of the money was given to
132
the city of Chicago to create a bus rapid transit system. The city of Los
Angeles also received a portion of the federal funding set aside for New
York to implement their own congestion pricing scheme, the High

125. Schwartz et al., supra note 101, at 595 (citing Press Release, Quinnipiac University, State Voters
Back NYC Traffic Fee 2–1, If Funds Go to Transit, Quinnipiac University Poll Finds (Mar. 24, 2008)). See
Congestion Pricing Plan, S. 6068, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); see also S. 6420, 2007 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S. 6432, 2007 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); S. 7243, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008);
A 1838, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2007); A 9362, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2007); A 10198, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008); A 10406, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2008); A 10466, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2008); A 11319, 2008 Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (N.Y. 2008).
126. Confessore, supra note 124; see also Millard, supra note 76, at 34 (“Indeed, outer-borough
opposition helped doom Bloomberg’s 2008 congestion-pricing plan in the State Assembly. Opponents
played up the ‘Manhattan elitist’ aspect of charging drivers for a previously unpriced privilege, despite
Tri-State Transportation Campaign studies pointing out that drivers have up to twice the income of
non-drivers.”).
127. Nicholas Confessore, Congestion Pricing Plan Dies in Albany, N.Y. Times (Apr. 7, 2008, 3:01
PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/04/07/congestion-pricing-plan-is-dead-assembly-speakersays/.
128. Michael H. Schuitema, Comment, Road Pricing as a Solution to the Harms of Traffic
Congestion, 34 Transp. L.J. 81, 106–07, 112 (2007) (noting that the question is not whether congestion
pricing will work, but whether there is enough public and political support to start the scheme, that
inequity concerns are overstated especially since rebates could be provided for certain categories of
commuters, and suggesting that congestion pricing revenue could be allocated to improve social
benefits and that phasing in with trucks first will be more likely accepted since they cause
disproportionately more air pollution, infrastructure damage, and road congestion).
129. Schwartz et al., supra note 101, at 595.
130. Aaron Naparstek, Chicago Gets NYC’s Congestion Pricing Money, StreetsBlog NYC (Apr.
29, 2008), http://www.streetsblog.org/2008/04/29/chicago-gets-nycs-congestion-pricing-money/.
131. Neuman, supra note 110.
132. Naparstek, supra note 130.
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133

Occupancy Tool Lanes (“HOT Lanes”). Los Angeles’s HOT Lane
program has attracted more than twice the number of expected drivers,
and will generate between $18 million and $20 million per year for mass
134
transit.
Former Transportation Commissioner, Sam Schwartz, recently
135
advanced a new congestion pricing plan called MoveNY. Bloomberg
136
endorsed this plan in his post-Sandy resiliency report. Schwartz argues
that his plan is more equitable than the Bloomberg’s original plan
because it would lower the tolls on inter- and intra-borough crossings not
located in lower Manhattan in addition to raising tolls on drivers entering
137
Lower Manhattan’s Business District. A portion of the tolls would go
138
directly to road improvements. The four East River Bridges would
have a $7 toll and a $5 E-ZPass toll, while the Verrazano, the RFK, and
139
the Bronx Whitestone Bridge would be cheaper. As expected, the
political support appears mixed, but this new plan may be more
successful as it would be much more comprehensive, including the
140
construction of three large pedestrian bridges.
The congestion pricing fight seems to have left a bad taste in the
mouths of New York City voters, causing 2013 mayoral candidates to
141
largely avoid the congestion pricing issue. Notably, City Council
Speaker and mayoral candidate Christine Quinn, a staunch advocate of
congestion pricing since 2007, recently expressed that the issue was
unlikely to come “back around” and that “[it] is just not going to
142
happen.” Despite this proclamation, public policy advocates in New
York City and the de Blasio administration alike are exploring more
innovative congestion pricing and traffic reduction ideas and proposals,

133. Matt Chaban, L.A. Beat New York to Congestion Pricing and Andrew Cuomo Could Care
Less, N.Y. Observer (Jan. 11, 2013, 3:35 PM), http://observer.com/2013/01/l-a-beat-new-york-tocongestion-pricing-and-andrew-cuomo-could-care-less/.
134. Id.
135. Dana Rubinstein, Bloomberg’s New Resiliency Plan Nods (on Page 406!) to a Congestion Pricing
Scheme, Capital (June 13, 2013, 12:39 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2013/06/
8530922/bloombergs-new-resiliency-plan-nods-page-406-congestion-pricing-sch.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Kate Hinds, Congestion Pricing Is Back . . . And the NY Times’ Former Editor Really Likes It,
WYNC (Mar. 5, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.wnyc.org/blogs/transportation-nation/2012/mar/05/congestionpricing-its-back-and-the-ny-times-former-editor-really-likes-it/.
140. Id.
141. Dana Rubinstein, Why Do the 2013 Candidates Treat Congestion Pricing like a Third Rail?,
Capital (Mar. 5, 2013, 12:12 PM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2013/03/8144782/whydo-2013-candidates-treat-congestion-pricing-third-rail.
142. Dana Rubinstein, Christine Quinn Won’t Touch Congestion Pricing (Anymore), Capital
(Feb. 15, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/politics/2013/02/7784800/christinequinn-wont-touch-congestion-pricing-anymore.
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even though Mayor de Blasio clearly does not support the Bloomberg
proposal.
C. The New York City Urban Food System
In recent years, New York has also done much to improve food
issues in the city as they relate to public health, and, like environmental
law scholarship, have started to appreciate the link between
environmental health and public health. This is especially true when it
comes to children, schools, and food, even though the city and state lag
behind in developing a more sustainable local food system (such as,
community supported agriculture, farmers markets, and quality available
143
produce). For example, Bloomberg promoted the “New York City
School Salad Bar Initiative” which removed soda machines and provided
144
salad bars to elementary schools across the city’s five boroughs. In
January 2010, Bloomberg unveiled a plan to cut the amount of salt in
packaged and restaurant food by twenty-five percent over a five-year
145
period. In 2006, the New York City Board of Health approved
Bloomberg’s plan to ban trans fat in cooking oils and gave restaurants
146
eighteen months to make the change, which may have led the way for
147
an FDA trans fat ban. However, nothing proved more controversial
than the proposed sugary drink ban, or more ubiquitous than food
calorie labeling on menus. At the same time, composting in New York
148
City and its schools is seeing significant support as well.
1.

Sugary Drinks

The impacts of sugar and obesity are often underestimated, and
scholars are beginning to discuss serious regulation of sugar, similar to

143. Carolyn Silveira, New York and California Are Conspicuously Absent from One Ranking of
Coolness, Upworthy (Oct. 14, 2013), http://www.upworthy.com/new-york-and-california-areconspicuously-absent-from-one-ranking-of-coolness. See generally Jason J. Czarnezki, Food, Law and
the Environment: Informational and Structural Changes for a Sustainable Food System, 31 Utah
Envtl. L. Rev. 263 (2011) (considering legal, theoretical, and practical steps for a more sustainable
food model).
144. Press Release, City of N.Y., Mayor Bloomberg and Whole Foods Market Open New Store
and Announce Donation of 57 Salad Bars to City Public Schools as Part of City’s New Plan to Install
Salad Bars in All Schools (Aug. 23, 2012).
145. William Neuman, Citing Hazard, New York Says Hold the Salt, N.Y. Times (Jan. 10, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/11/business/11salt.html; see also Michael Howard Saul & Laura
Kusisto, Efforts to Cut Salt Content Take Hold, Wall St. J. (Feb. 11, 2013, 7:31 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324880504578298271512023796.
146. Thomas J. Lueck & Kim Severson, New York Bans Most Trans Fats in Restaurants, N.Y.
Times (Dec. 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/06/nyregion/06fat.html.
147. David B. Caruso, Bloomberg Trans Fat Ban in NYC Set Example for FDA, Huffington Post
(Nov. 8, 2013, 8:25 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/08/bloomberg-trans-fat_n_4239264.html.
148. See Al Baker, At School, Turning Good Food into Perfectly Good Compost, N.Y. Times, June
23, 2014, at A1.
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149

that of tobacco. With New York already experiencing significant
tobacco regulation, Mayor Bloomberg proposed a ban on the sale of
sugary drinks in containers larger than sixteen ounces as part of a larger
150
plan to combat obesity. Bloomberg stated that “[t]his year, for the first
time in the history of the world, more will die from too much food than
151
from too little food.” He categorized the proposed ban as a gentle
“remind[er]” to consumers; “if you want to have 32 ounces, just buy two
152
16 ounce cups.” He also sought to categorize it as “portion control”
153
rather than a “ban.”
The ban would have only included establishments that received
health department grades; supermarkets, convenient stores, and vending
154
machines would be excluded. Refills were not to be banned and failure
155
to comply would have led to a $200 fine. A sugary beverage was
categorized as a drink with more than twenty-five calories per every eight
ounces; the definition did not include juices and smoothies that are more
than seventy percent fruit, drinks with more than half milk, alcoholic
156
beverages, or calorie-free diet sodas.
On September 13, 2012, the New York City Board of Health voted
unanimously (with one abstention) to ban the sale of sugary drinks in
157
containers larger than sixteen ounces. The Board of Health was the
158
only regulatory approval needed to pass the ban, as reprinted below :
§ 81.53. Maximum Beverage Size.
(a) Definition of terms used in this section.
(1) Sugary drink means a carbonated or non-carbonated
beverage that:

149. See generally Barbara L. Atwell, Is Sugar the New Tobacco? How to Regulate Toxic Foods,
22 Annals Health L. 138 (2013) (noting severity of the sugar problem and suggesting it should be
regulated like tobacco products).
150. George Lerner, New York Health Board Approves Ban on Large Sodas, CNN Health (Sept. 14,
2012, 6:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/health/new-york-soda-ban; see also Combating Obesity,
MikeBloomberg.com, http://www.mikebloomberg.com/global-impact/public-health/ (last visited Aug. 5,
2015).
151. David Sherfinski, N.Y. Mayor Bloomberg: ‘Ban’ on Large Sugary Drinks ‘in the Country’s
Interest’, Wash. Times (Mar. 10, 2013, 11:29 AM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/insidepolitics/2013/mar/10/ny-mayor-bloomberg-ban-large-sugary-drinks-country/.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Rachel Weiner, The New York City Soda Ban Explained, Wash. Post (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/11/the-new-york-city-soda-ban-explained/.
155. Id.
156. N.Y.C. Health Code § 81.53 (2012); Jill Colvin, New York Soda Ban Approved: Board of Health
OKs Limiting Sale of Large-Sized, Sugary Drinks, Huffington Post (Sept. 13, 2012, 11:37 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/13/new-york-approves-soda-ban-big-sugary-drinks_n_1880868.html.
157. George Lerner, New York Health Board Approves Ban on Large Sodas, CNN (Sept. 14, 2012,
6:17 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/13/health/new-york-soda-ban.
158. Michael M. Grynbaum, Health Panel Approves Restriction on Sale of Large Sugary Drinks,
N.Y. Times, Sept. 14, 2012, at A24.
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(A) is non-alcoholic;
(B) is sweetened by the manufacturer or establishment
with sugar or another caloric sweetener;
(C) has greater than 25 calories per 8 fluid ounces of
beverage; and
(D) does not contain more than 50 percent of milk or milk
substitute by volume as an ingredient.
The volume of milk or milk substitute in a beverage will be
presumed to be less than or equal to 50 percent unless
proven otherwise by the food service establishment serving
it.
(2) Milk substitute means any liquid that is soy-based and is
intended by its manufacturer to be a substitute for milk.
(3) Self-service cup means a cup or container provided by a
food service establishment that is filled with a beverage by
the customer.
(b) Sugary drinks. A food service establishment may not sell,
offer, or provide a sugary drink in a cup or container that is able to
contain more than 16 fluid ounces.
(c) Self-service cups. A food service establishment may not sell,
offer, or provide to any customer a self-service cup or container that
is able to contain more than 16 fluid ounces.
(d) Violations of this section. Notwithstanding the fines,
penalties, and forfeitures outlined in Article 3 of this Code, a food
service establishment determined to have violated this section will be
subject to a fine of no more than two hundred dollars for each
violation and no more than one violation of this section may be cited
159
at each inspection of a food service establishment.

On March 11, 2013, the day before the soda ban was meant to take
effect, a New York Supreme Court Judge (trial level) overturned the
160
ban. Supreme Court Justice Milton Tingling called the proposed
161
regulations “arbitrary and capricious.” He found that the Board of
Health had overstepped its authority to protect against and prevent
diseases, because they did not have the authority to “limit or ban a legal
162
item under the guise of ‘controlling chronic disease.’” Further, he noted
that the ban would not apply equally across eating establishments:
convenience stores and supermarkets would be exempt as well as sugary
163
milk products.

159. N.Y.C. Health Code § 81.53 (2012).
160. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Health &
Mental Hygiene, No. 653584/12, 2013 WL 1343607, slip op. at 20 (N.Y.S. Mar. 11, 2013).
161. Id. at 1.
162. Id. at 16.
163. Id. at 6.

N1 - Czarnezki_18 (DUKANOVIC)

August 2015]

8/26/2015 3:59 PM

NEW YORK CITY RULES!

1647

On July 30, 2013, the New York State Supreme Court, Appellate
164
Division concurred with the lower court. It held that while they had the
authority to ban “inherently harmful” foodstuffs from consumption in
165
the general public, sugary drinks do not fall into that category.
However, the Bloomberg administration appeared to be undeterred,
referring to the Appellate Division decision as merely a “temporary
166
167
setback.” The Board of Health unsuccessfully appealed the decision.
The “soda ban” has faced myriad criticisms. Some accuse
Bloomberg of selective enforcement because, for example, “[a]
Starbucks twenty-ounce drink can have more than 500 calories, but will
168
be exempt from the ban because it contains more than 50% milk.”
Others complained that the soda ban is too targeted for such a broad
169
issue as obesity. Also, conservatives have derided the ban as “fascis[t]”
170
and Bloomberg as a “nanny.”
Kirsten Witt Webb, a spokesperson for Coca-Cola sought to cast
Bloomberg as paternalistic: “The people of New York City are much
171
smarter than the New York City Health Department believes.”
Starbucks went so far as to refuse to change any of their offerings to
meet the requirements of the ban the day before the ban was to take
172
Brian Wansink and David Just, health scientists quoted
effect.
frequently by the Bloomberg administration in support of the ban, wrote

164. N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dept. of Health &
Mental Hygiene, 970 N.Y.S.2d 200, 213 (2013).
165. Id. at 211 (stating that the Health Board is designed to protect the public from “inherently
harmful matters,” but that “soda consumption cannot be classified as a health hazard per se”).
166. Michael Howard Saul, Bloomberg Loses in Sugary Drinks Fight: Court Upholds Decision to
Block City Effort to Control Sugary Beverage Portions, Wall St. J. (July 30, 2013, 9:10 PM),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324354704578638223419343406.html.
167. N.Y. Statewide Coal., 970 N.Y.S.2d at 213. The motion for leave to appeal was granted on
October 17, 2013. See N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of
Health & Mental Hygiene, No. 2013-869, 2013 WL 5658229 (N.E.2d Oct. 17, 2013). The appeal was
denied. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Court of Appeals, Ruling 4-2, Ends City’s Fight to Limit Size of
Sugary Drinks, N.Y. Times, June 27, 2014, at A24; see also N.Y. Statewide Coal. of Hispanic Chambers
of Commerce v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene, 16 N.E.3d 538 (2014).
168. David Frum, Bloomberg’s Visionary Move Against Obesity, CNN (June 4, 2012, 8:32 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/04/opinion/frum-bloomberg-soda/index.html.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Henry Goldman & Duane Stanford, NYC Mayor Bloomberg Seeks Ban on Super-Size Soft
Drinks, Bloomberg Bus. (May 31, 2012, 11:56 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-05-31/nycmayor-bloomberg-seeks-ban-on-super-size-soft-drinks.html.
172. Ashley Lutz, Starbucks Refuses to Follow NYC Sugary Drink Ban—Mayor Bloomberg
Dismisses This as ‘Ridiculous’, Yahoo! Fin. (Mar. 11, 2013, 10:28 AM), http://finance.yahoo.com/news/
bloomberg-calls-starbucks-ridiculous-trying-141800897.html.
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not only that Bloomberg has misinterpreted their findings but also that
173
the ban would backfire for New York City Public Health.
2.

Calorie Menu Labeling

New York City’s calorie labeling on menus measure (in the category
of informational regulation) was designed to combat the increased
instances of obesity in New York City. The Public Notice of Adoption
cited a series of statistics demonstrating the severity of the obesity
epidemic: the obesity rate of U.S. adults has more than doubled over the
past thirty years; the cases of diabetes have doubled; more than half of
the adults in New York City are overweight and one in six is obese;
174
twenty-one percent of New York City kindergarten students are obese.
Calorie labeling was also meant to address the issue of “away from
175
home” food consumption. Statistics from the Public Notice document
include: children eat nearly twice as many calories when they eat out, as
compared to when they eat at home; the average American consumes
one third of their calories from restaurant food; from 1970 to 2006, the
percentage of food dollars spent on eating out nearly doubled, from
176
twenty-six percent to forty-eight percent.
Finally, these New York Rules are meant to bring the success of the
177
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (“NLEA”) to restaurants. The
Department of Health first demonstrated that food labeling is an
effective strategy to inform consumers (three-quarters of Americans use
food labeling and forty-eight percent report that they have changed their
178
eating habits as a result). They then identified the inadequacy of
current efforts of those restaurants that make caloric information
publicly available: restaurants most often hide the information on
placemats under food, or on food wrappers only accessible after the
179
purchase is made.
They further added that nine out of ten people underestimate the
180
caloric value of unhealthy foods by approximately fifty percent. Those
same people chose unhealthy foods twenty-four percent to thirty-seven

173. Brian Wansink & David Just, How Bloomberg’s Soft Drink Ban Will Backfire on NYC Public
Health, Atlantic (June 14, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/06/how-bloombergssoft-drink-ban-will-backfire-on-nyc-public-health/258501/.
174. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene Bd. of Health, Notice of Adoption of an Amendment
(§ 81.50) to Article 81 of the N.Y.C. Health Code, NYC Health 1, 2 (Dec. 5, 2006),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-hc-art81-50.pdf.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.; see also L.R., New York’s Calorie Counting, Economist (July 28, 2011, 12:14 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2011/07/menu-labelling.
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percent less when given the calorie information. Additionally, the
American Heart Association, along with others, issued a statement in
182
support of menu labeling.
“On September 26, 2006, the New York City Department of Health
proposed the nation’s first menu labeling law, Regulation 81.50 . . .
183
designed to primarily impact large, chain restaurants.” On December 5,
2006, the New York City Board of Health voted to amend its health code
to require restaurants that make calorie information publicly available to
post it on menus and menu boards, where it is easily visible to consumers
184
when they order, by March 1, 2007.
Following a successful legal challenge to the applicability wording of
185
initial regulations, the New York City Board of Health voted to amend
the health code to require the posting of calorie information for all
restaurants with 15 or more locations nationwide that serve a
186
standardized menu. In upholding the revised law, Judge Holwell stated,
“It seems reasonable to expect that some consumers will use the

181. Dep’t of Health, supra note 174, at 2.
182. Position Statement on Menu Labeling, Am. Heart Ass’n, http://www.heart.org/idc/groups/
heart-public/@wcm/@adv/documents/downloadable/ucm_428424.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
183. Brent Bernell, The History and Impact of the New York City Menu Labeling Law, 65 Food &
Drug L.J. 839, 839 (2010) (citing Summary and Response to Public Hearing and Comments Received
Regarding Amendment of Article 81 of the New York City Health Code Adding a New Section 81.50
to Require Calorie Labeling on Menus and Menu Boards from Lynn D. Silver, Assistant Comm’r, and
Candace Young, Dir., to Thomas R. Frieden, Comm’r (Nov. 27, 2006), available at
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/hc-art81-50-1006-response.pdf); see also Ashley
Arthur, Combating Obesity: Our Country’s Need for a National Standard to Replace the Growing
Patchwork of Local Menu Labeling Laws, 7 Ind. Health L. Rev. 305 (2010).
184. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Board of Health Votes to
Require Calorie Labeling in Some New York City Restaurants (Dec. 5, 2006); Thomas A. Farley et al.,
New York City’s Fight Over Calorie Labeling, 28 Health Affairs 1098 (2009); Jodi Shuette Green,
Cheeseburger in Paradise? An Analysis of How New York State Restaurant Association v. New York
City Board of Health May Reform Our Fast Food Nation, 59 DePaul L. Rev. 733, 733 (2010).
185. The New York State Restaurant Association challenged the regulation in New York State
Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health (NYSRA I) and emerged victorious when the
court declared the regulation preempted by the Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990
(“NLEA”). N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y. Bd. of Health, 509 F. Supp. 2d 351, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
186. See Green, supra note 184, at 735 (“The Restaurant Association promptly challenged the new
regulation, alleging that it was preempted under the NLEA and unconstitutional under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. In New York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City
Board of Health (NYSRA II), Judge Holwell of the Southern District of New York upheld the
regulation. Although the Restaurant Association appealed, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding on February 17, 2009, in New York State
Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Board of Health (NYSRA III). Ultimately, by upholding
Regulation 81.50, the NYSRA II and III courts provided a foundation for the enactment of similar
legislation in other jurisdictions and stimulated a nationwide debate over the proper role of
government in addressing America’s growing obesity crisis.”).
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information” on menus and menu boards “to select lower-calorie
187
meals.” The revised code reads as follows:
§ 81.50 Calorie labeling.
(a) Scope and applicability. This section shall apply to menu
items that are served in portions the size and content of which are
standardized and for which calorie content information is made
publicly available on or after March 1, 2007, by or on behalf of the
food service establishment serving the items.
(b) Calorie information for menu items. Food service
establishments shall post on menu boards and menus the calorie
content values (in kcal) that have been made publicly available as
specified in subdivision (a) for each menu item next to the listing of
each menu item. Posted calorie content shall be calculated in
accordance with 21 CFR §101.9(c)(1)(i) or its successor regulation.
Subject to prior approval by the Department, food service
establishments may use alternative means for making calorie
information available to patrons, provided such information is made
available at the point of purchase and is at least as prominent as
required in paragraph (1) below.
(1) Menu boards and menus. The term “calories” or “cal”
shall appear as a heading above a column listing the calorie
content value of each menu item, or adjacent to the calorie
content value for each menu item, in the same or larger
typeface as the calorie content values for individual menu
items.
(A) Menu boards. On menu boards, calorie content values
shall be posted in a size and typeface at least as large as the
name of the menu item or price, whichever is larger.
(B) Menus. On printed menus, calorie content values shall
be legible and shall be printed in a size and typeface at
least as large as the name or price of the menu item.
(2) Range of calorie content values for different flavors and
varieties. For menu items that come in different flavors and
varieties but that are listed as a single menu item, including,
but not limited to, beverages, ice cream, pizza or doughnuts,
the range of calorie content values showing the minimum to
maximum numbers of calories for all flavors or varieties of
that item shall be listed on menu boards and menus for each
size offered for sale.
(c) Effective date. This section shall take effect on July 1, 2007.
Notes: Section 81.50 was added by resolution adopted on
December 5, 2006 to require that food service establishments in New
York City that sell food items whose portion size and content are
standardized prominently display publicly available information about

187. N.Y. State Rest. Ass’n v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Health, No. 08 Civ. 1000(RJH), 2008 WL 1752455,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y Apr. 16, 2008); see also L.R., supra note 180.

N1 - Czarnezki_18 (DUKANOVIC)

August 2015]

8/26/2015 3:59 PM

NEW YORK CITY RULES!

1651

the calorie content of such items on menu boards and menus in an
188
effort to facilitate patrons’ nutritional choices at time of purchase.

New York was the first city in the country to enact a menu-labeling
189
law. Since 2008, California, Maine, Seattle, Oregon, Maine, and
Philadelphia have enacted similar laws, and the federal 2010 Affordable
Care Act required calorie information to be displayed on both vending
machines and menus of restaurants with more than twenty locations
190
nationwide.
In response to the feedback received during the public comment
period, the Health Department will allow alternative ways to display the
information if pre-approved by the Health Department and to post the
calorie range (instead of median) for products that come in a variety of
191
flavors.
During the public comment period leading up to the final vote by
the New York City Board of Health, 2267 comments were submitted;
2245 (ninety-nine percent) were in favor of the proposal and twenty-two
192
were in opposition. But while the public has strongly supported the
calorie informational labeling initiative, studies evaluating the positive
health impacts have come to decidedly different conclusions as to
193
whether such labeling actually helps limit calorie intake. That said,
research indicates that restaurants are increasing their low calorie food
194
options as a result of the new rule.
3.

Composting

Will composting come to New York City? The city has seen mixed
results with recycling. The city has approved the recycling of hard plastics

188. N.Y.C. Health Code § 81.50 (2005) (amended 2007).
189. L.R., supra note 180.
190. Id.
191. Press Release, N.Y.C. Dep’t of Health and Mental Hygiene, Board of Health Votes to
Require Calorie Labeling in Some New York City Restaurants (Dec. 5, 2006).
192. Id.
193. L.R., supra note 180; see Mary T. Bassett et al., Purchasing Behavior and Calorie Information
at Fast-Food Chains in New York City, 2007, 98 Am. J. Pub. Health 1457, 1457–59 (2008); Julie S.
Downs et al., The Psychology of Food Consumption: Strategies for Promoting Healthier Food Choices,
99 Am. Econ. Rev. 159, 159–64 (2009); Tamara Dumanovsky et al., Changes in Energy Content of
Lunchtime Purchases from Fast Food Restaurants After Introduction of Calorie Labelling: Cross
Sectional Customer Surveys, BMJ (July 26, 2011), http://www.bmj.com/content/343/bmj.d4464; Brian
Elbel et al., Calorie Labeling and Food Choices: A First Look at the Effects on Low-Income People in
New York City, 28 Health Affairs 1110 (2009); Anemona Hartocollis, Study Finds Calorie Postings
in Restaurants Don’t Change Eating Habits, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 2009, at A26; Corby Kummer, Yes,
Calorie Labeling Works, Atlantic (Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/
2009/10/yes-calorie-labeling-works/28073/; Bryan Bollinger et al., Calorie Posting in Chain Restaurants
1-2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15648, 2010), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w15648.
194. L.R., supra note 180; Bassett et al., supra note 193.
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and public space recycling, but recycling rates could be much better. Will
195
Bloomberg’s “parting gift” of composting fare better?
New York City creates approximately fourteen million tons of solid
196
waste annually but recycles only about half of it. One quarter of the
waste comes from homes, one quarter comes from businesses, and the
197
The
remaining half comes from demolition and construction.
Department of Sanitation handles 13,000 tons of waste per day, and
198
private carting companies handle the remainder. The city aims to divert
at least seventy-five percent of its waste from landfills as part of the new
199
plan.
The city spends $2 billion annually to dispose of its waste,
$300 million of which goes to the disposal of garbage in out-of-state
200
landfills. On average, it costs the city $95 per ton to ship garbage to
201
landfills. Tractor-trailer trucks travel approximately forty million miles
202
to dispose of New York City’s garbage.
Food waste is a significant contributor to the high amount of waste
generated. Restaurants alone create half a million tons of waste per
203
year. In order to address this problem, Mayor Bloomberg issued a
challenge in 2012 to reduce food waste by fifty percent and to institute a
204
food waste tracking program.
Following the lead of San Francisco, Seattle and dozens of smaller
cities, New York City plans to require recycling of food waste generated
205
in homes. The program is part of a much larger effort to address New
York City waste disposal problems by diverting thirty percent of waste
206
away from landfills by 2017. Food waste accounts for approximately

195. Margaret Hartmann, Bloomberg’s Parting Gift for NYC: Mandatory Composting, N.Y. Mag.
(June 16, 2013, 11:24 PM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/bloombergs-parting-giftmandatory-composting.html; Mireya Navarro, Bloomberg Plan Aims to Require Food Composting,
N.Y. Times (June 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/17/nyregion/bloombergs-final-recyclingfrontier-food-waste.html.
196. Waste and Recycling, City of N.Y., http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/theplan/solidwaste.shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2015).
197. Id.
198. Michael Graham Richard, New York City: Sustainable City?, TreeHugger (Oct. 19, 2006),
http://www.treehugger.com/travel/new-york-city-sustainable-city.html.
199. Waste and Recycling, supra note 196.
200. Citizens Budget Comm’n, Taxes In, Garbage Out: The Need for Better Solid Waste
Disposal Policies in New York City, at i (May 2012), http://www.cbcny.org/sites/default/files/
REPORT_SolidWaste_053312012.pdf.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Waste and Recycling, supra note 196.
204. Id.
205. Navarro, supra note 195.
206. Henry Goldman, Bloomberg to Require New Yorkers to Recycle Food for Composting,
Bloomberg Bus. (June 17, 2013, 8:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-17/bloomberg-torequire-new-yorkers-to-recycle-food-for-composting.html.
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1.2 million tons of waste annually, or thirty-five percent of the city’s total
207
waste, which is sent to landfills at $80 per ton.
The program would initially be voluntary but would eventually
become mandatory, subjecting New York City citizens to fines similar to
208
those incurred for failing to separate metal, paper, or plastic today. The
first wave would include 150,000 single-family homes, 100 high-rise
209
buildings, and 600 schools, with the entire city covered by 2016. The
program would be spread across the five boroughs, with at least 25,000
210
homes in each. The city sanitation department would collect the food
scraps from brown curbside bins, just as metal, glass, and paper are
211
collected today. Citizens residing in apartments will dump their waste
212
into common, centrally located collection points.
The city has conducted pilot programs, which it claims have shown
213
“an unexpectedly high level of participation.” One pilot program,
conducted on Staten Island, had a remarkable forty-three percent
214
participation rate. As part of the pilot project, ninety schools in
Brooklyn and Manhattan increased their diversion rates from fifteen
215
percent to thirty-eight percent and thirty-five percent, respectively.
The city plans to hire a composting facility to handle approximately
ten percent of New York City’s residential food waste, or 100,000 tons of
216
food per year. The city is also set to take proposals from companies
willing to build a facility in the New York area to produce biogas, or
217
218
power generators, as well as fertilizer.
The biggest criticisms of the plan come from superintendents and
landlords, who would be subject to the added burden of managing the
new containers and keeping pests, which would be attracted to the added

207. Id.
208. Navarro, supra note 195.
209. Id.
210. Erin Durkin, NYC Could Be on Top of the Heap as the City’s Composting Program Expands,
N.Y. Daily News (June 17, 2013, 12:28 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/
nyc-food-composting-program-expands-article-1.1374482.
211. Bloomberg Composting Plan Aims to Require New Yorkers to Separate Food Waste, Huffington
Post (June 17, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/17/bloomberg-composting-newyork_n_3453164.html.
212. Goldman, supra note 206.
213. Navarro, supra note 195.
214. Goldman, supra note 206; Durkin, supra note 210.
215. Goldman, supra note 206.
216. Navarro, supra note 195.
217. Bloomberg Composting Plan Aims to Require New Yorkers to Separate Food Waste,
Huffington Post (June 17, 2013, 9:37 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/17/bloombergcomposting-new-york_n_3453164.html; Navarro, supra note 195.
218. Goldman, supra note 206.
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219

smell, away from their buildings. This issue could be exacerbated by
220
the increasingly aged buildings in many parts of New York City. One
author also expressed skepticism because “increasingly upscale” New
221
Yorkers are unlikely to manage their rotting waste. Mayor Bloomberg
also drew criticism after admitting that he has not cooked a single meal
222
since the beginning of the program, and has, thus, not participated. In
contrast, Mayor de Blasio strongly supports the program, including the
223
intention to make it mandatory over time.

III. Regulation and the New York City Experience
In light of the New York experience, this Part evaluates theoretical
notions of regulation—nudges and social norms—and how they might
inform us as to the proper strategy for effectively passing and
implementing effective regulatory approaches in our local environments.
More specifically, do past normative conclusions hold?
From this, two overwhelming themes emerge for promoting everyday
environmentalism, both relying on information as a driver for change.
First, and most obviously, there must be a concerted and basic effort to
raise awareness of the environmental costs of individual behavior in
the aggregate and of the potential power of changes in individual
behavior. Second, to generate change in individual behavior,
policymakers should evaluate and apply specific decision-making tools
to: (1) promote focused efforts to increase public awareness of the
aggregate environmental costs of particular individual behavior,
(2) determine the appropriate level of government or private action
best suited to address that category of behavior, (3) create and
promote use of broader information and labeling so individuals can
evaluate the ecological costs of a service or product, (4) create
economic incentives to influence individual behavior and take account
of the value of ecosystem services, (5) use policies and approaches that
target the key audience and products, and (6) support and facilitate
224
effective community initiatives and personal efforts.

These conclusions still hold, especially in the power of local
governments and local communities to help create sustainable
communities and in the potential power and popularity of informational

219. Samantha Guff, Why Michael Bloomberg’s Composting Plan Stinks for Supers, Daily Beast
(June 19, 2013, 4:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/06/19/why-michael-bloomberg-scomposting-plan-stinks-for-supers.html.
220. Josh Dawsey, Compost Bins’ New Frontier: Mayor Pushing Food-Scraps Program into Bronx,
Brooklyn, Wall St. J. (July 29, 2013, 9:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323854904578
636452219221628.html.
221. Guff, supra note 219.
222. Jill Colvin, Mayor Bloomberg Admits He’s Not Exactly a Model Composter, Observer (July
29, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://observer.com/2013/07/mayor-bloomberg-admits-hes-not-exactly-a-modelcomposter/.
223. Navarro, supra note 195.
224. Czarnezki, supra note 2, at 141–42.
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regimes. But initiatives must be more sophisticated in how they provide
information to consumers, especially in the context of eco-labeling.
Governments should more readily consider positive economic incentives
(that is, carrots) due to the political trouble inherent with economic
penalties (that is, sticks). They must determine how to use community
and shifting norms to enable political support for legislation that
otherwise reduces personal autonomy. Finally, the development of
infrastructure is underappreciated in policy and literature. Given the
death of national environmental legislation and the reemerging norms
agenda, traditional post-war infrastructure and investment must be
reimagined for modern sustainable communities.
In terms of public opinion, “Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg’s
crusades to restrict smoking, encourage biking, expose calorie counts and
sideline automobiles are now overwhelmingly embraced by New York
City residents, according to a New York Times poll, making his
experiments in behavioral modification an unexpectedly popular
225
hallmark of his legacy.” Yet as initiatives have increased costs for
consumers and continue to limit personal choice and autonomy, the ease
of the political passage and public support of such regulations decreases.
What conclusions can we draw then from Bloomberg’s environmental
legacy?
First, fundamental positive change can result from the building of
infrastructure. This is often understated (including in this Author’s
work). For example, seventy-three percent of New Yorkers approve of
226
the Citi Bike bike-sharing program, and two-thirds wants better bike
227
and pedestrian infrastructure. Seventy-two percent approve of the
pedestrian plazas installed around the city during the Bloomberg
administration, and sixty-four percent approve of the constructed bike
228
lanes. “The transportation commissioner, Janette Sadik-Khan, added
285 miles of bike lanes and turned over parts of Broadway near Times

225. Michael Barbaro & Megan Thee-Brenan, A Mayor, for Better or for Worse, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 25, 2013, at MB2; see also Ginia Bellafante, A Mayor Who Puts Wall Street First, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 18, 2013, at MB10 (“Among the various enduring images of the Bloomberg years, many are
positive and some perhaps even blessed: bike lanes, smokeless restaurants, new expanses of green
space, the increased presence of ferries on the city’s waterways.”); Jim Dwyer, The Impossible Mayor
of the Possible, N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 2013, at MB4 (“Not just the air changed. City parkland grew by
about 800 acres; 750,000 new trees have been planted, toward a goal of one million, an initiative that
took off after the parks commissioner, Adrian Benepe, reported that every dollar the city spent on a
tree returned $5.50 in savings on heating, cooling and public health.”).
226. Stephen Miller, Times Poll: New Yorkers Really Love Bike Lanes, Bike-Share, and Plazas,
StreetsBlog NYC (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.streetsblog.org/2013/08/16/times-poll-new-yorkersreally-love-bike-lanes-bike-share-and-plazas/.
227. Sarah Goodyear, Two-Thirds of New York City Voters Say They Want Better Bike and
Pedestrian Infrastructure, CityLab, Oct. 1, 2013, http://www.theatlanticcities.com/commute/2013/10/twothirds-new-york-city-voters-say-they-want-better-bike-and-pedestrian-infrastructure/7085/.
228. Miller, supra note 226.

N1 - Czarnezki_18 (DUKANOVIC)

1656

8/26/2015 3:59 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:1621

229

Square to pedestrians.” Ironically, the key seems to be to push through
infrastructure programs that face potential political problems at the
initial development stage because the costs are more evenly distributed.
In addition, the newly built infrastructure tends to prove quite popular
due to the resulting increased quality of life and efficiency.
Second, both politicians and citizens disfavor perceived taxes, like
congestion pricing, and bans, like those on sugary drinks. Thus, the
congestion pricing initiative failed. Also, “[b]y a wide margin, people
disapprove of [Mayor Bloomberg’s] attempt to reduce obesity by limiting
sales of sugary drinks in containers larger than 16 ounces,” and fifty-nine
230
percent of New Yorkers objected to the regulation.
But it seems knowledge—at least to the extent it reaches a critical
mass—can alleviate many of the concerns related to bans. This explains
why bans on smoking tobacco in public places and bans on sugary drinks
are viewed differently. The dangers of tobacco are now well known,
while severe concerns regarding obesity, sugar, and diet are still
underappreciated. Journalist David Frum presented a series of statistics
in support of the soda ban: “Sugary drinks now provide 7% of the
calories in the American diet, the largest single national source of
calories. Teen boys average more than a quart of sugary soda per day. . . .
Just one soda a day doubles a woman’s risk of diabetes . . . [t]wo sodas
231
raises her risk of heart disease by 40%.”
The irony in comparing congestion pricing to sugary drinks is that
the public greatly favored congestion pricing, yet it was defeated in the
political arena. On the other hand, Mayor Bloomberg and his Board of
Health supported the sugary drink ban despite public opposition.
Certainly, one reason for this irony is that congestion pricing required far
more political support and process from the New York legislature and
the New York City Council than was required for the sugary drink ban,
which required support of the mayor and Board of Health. It seems,
however, that the major takeaway is that, like infrastructure, major
restrictions of liberty require massive upfront expenditures of political
capital. This is key to understanding why the strategy is not used more
often. And significant political capital often does not exist, perhaps
illustrating, if anything, both the amazing success of the Bloomberg
administration and of the Mayor himself in implementing his

229. Dwyer, supra note 225.
230. Michael Barbaro & Megan Thee-Brenan, Poll Shows New Yorkers Are Deeply Conflicted Over
Bloomberg’s Legacy, N.Y. Times (Aug. 16, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/18/nyregion/whatnew-yorkers-think-of-mayor-bloomberg.html.
231. Frum, supra note 168. See generally Laurie J. Beyranevand, Generally Recognized as Safe?:
Analyzing Flaws in the FDA’s Approach to GRAS Additives, 37 Vt. L. Rev. 887 (2013) (discussing the
“not-so-sweet” and dangerous effects of sugar).
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environmental agenda, and the massive failure in failing to master
Albany’s capital politics in the context of congestion pricing.
Third, informational labeling is achievable and can gain popular
support, but the results and effectiveness are mixed. New York’s calorie
menu labeling initiative is certainly popular. In fact, “81 percent [of New
Yorkers] approve of [the] requirement that fast-food chains post calorie
counts on menus; 85 percent approve of [the] mandate that restaurants
232
display the letter grades given to them by the city.” Yet, as stated in
Part III, it is not clear that calorie labeling has been directly effective in
reducing calorie consumption. That said, there may be substantial
ancillary benefits. Illustrating the power of local rules, “[t]he New York
City law prompted numerous other cities, counties, and states to pass
similar laws . . . and eventually led the restaurant industry to drop
resistance to the idea and instead seek a unified, national standard for
233
menu labeling.” This may be powerful since, due to labeling, the
evidence suggest that existing menus will likely be modified to include
healthier, low-calorie items.
Hence, great care must be taken in creating and implementing any
234
label, using both innovation and technical expertise. It is also thought
“that government eco-labels are more effective than private ones, and
simple and transparent seal of approval logos and labels have generally
shaped consumer behavior more than the complex information235
disclosure labels.” “In addition, eco-labels require a good quality

232. Barbaro & Thee-Brenan, supra note 230.
233. Bernell, supra note 183, at 839–40.
234. Czarnezki, supra note 2, at 81–82.
An eco-label informational and certification scheme can provide engaged consumers with a
measurable analysis created by experts and also provide a single point of product
comparison for the less-engaged consumer. How would an eco-labeling scheme potentially
work? First, a group of experts must pick food categories to target, identified by the scope
of their adverse environmental impacts, where eco-labels would make a significant
improvement to the environment. These categories might include meats and seafood,
pesticide-intensive produce like berries, spinach and potatoes, and heavily processed foods.
Second, objective scientific criteria to evaluate products must include a full life-cycle
analysis. A life-cycle analysis would include consideration of natural resource and chemical
use (starting at the production process or raw extraction stage), as well as emissions and
pollution generated during the production, distribution and use, and disposal stages. The
key is to inventory the materials that make up the food and allow for food production as
well as the resulting environmental impact, something that is more difficult to determine.
Third, products would be evaluated according to those scientific criteria and a seal awarded.
Fourth, in light of technology and agricultural innovation, production selection criteria
would be consistently reviewed.
Id.
235. Id. at 83 (citing Abhijit Banerjee & Barry D. Solomon, Eco-Labeling for Energy Efficiency
and Sustainability: A Meta-Evaluation of US Programs, 31 Energy Pol’y 109 (2003)).
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assurance scheme (which also would benefit from governmental
236
ownership of the label) and a successful marketing program.”
Fourth, regulations that rely solely on the “nudge” approach should
be viewed with skepticism, at least to the extent that these regulations
are done by government to restrict liberty without baseline community
support, due to the political costs. A distinction can be drawn between
237
Bloomberg’s sugary drink ban and local initiatives that begin as
238
community norms, which were then more widely implemented.
Even broader in scope, part of the failure of the nudge approach is
that it both goes too far and does not go far enough, as we should favor
more direct regulation on individual action and choice. Indeed, Cass
Sunstein and Richard Thaler have persuasively argued that people can
be greatly influenced by small changes in context and have advocated
“libertarian paternalism,” which preserves liberty of choice in an
atmosphere where that choice is influenced to make the choosers better
239
off. They write that “[i]n other words, we argue for self-conscious
efforts, by institutions in the private sector and also by government, to
240
steer people’s choices in directions that will improve their lives.”
A concern is that the nudge approach will work to shrink
241
government services and replace traditional public policy. Another

236. Id. (citing Helen Nilsson et al., The Use of Eco-Labeling Like Initiatives on Food Products to
Promote Quality Assurance—Is There Enough Credibility?, 12 J. Cleaner Production 517 (2004)).
237. It is debatable whether the Bloomberg sugary drink ban is a nudge at all, or the type of direct
regulation that this Article advocates. Brian Galle considers it a nudge. Brian Galle, Tax,
Command . . . or Nudge?: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 837, 885 (“Either way, the
factors I have identified somewhat favor nudge-type approaches, such as the city’s cap, over a soda tax
or similar stick-like instrument, such as cutting subsidies to beverage ingredients or increasing tort
liability for beverage producers.”).
238. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Individual Carbon Emissions: The Low-Hanging
Fruit, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 1701 (2008) (identifying ways to reduce carbon emissions with out relying
heavily on government regulation).
239. Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Nudge 1–2, 5 (2008) (arguing that people can be
greatly influenced by small changes in context, and advocating “liberatarian paternalism” which
preserves liberty of choice in an atmosphere where that choice is influenced to make the choosers
better off).
240. Id. at 5 (“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak, soft, and noninstrusive type of
paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly burdened.”).
241. Katrin Bennhold, The Ministry of Nudges, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 2013, at BU1.
Others fear that the approach could become a euphemism for shrinking government
services. They accuse Mr. Cameron of testing the concept selectively; they say he has cut
deeply into welfare programs without putting those cuts to a rigorous test. The most
nuanced critique comes from those who question the ethics of behavioral experimentation
on unwitting, and sometimes vulnerable, citizens.
....
Nudging will never replace traditional public policy, said Mr. Halpern, the nudge unit’s
director. Paraphrasing Oliver Letwin, a cabinet minister, he said: “No one is proposing
removing the law against murder and replacing it with a nudge.’”
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concern is that, while there is clear merit in supporting such choice
242
architecture, the Sunstein and Thaler version is too libertarian in its
paternalism because it may inhibit the creation of significant government
infrastructure, both of the brick-and-mortar type and in terms of social
programs. Even Sunstein and Thaler suggest that sometimes it is
necessary to go further down the paternalistic path; they mention the
243
areas of health care and consumer protection. “Libertarian paternalism”
does not work for the big things, reductions in freedom of choice might be
necessary for major matters, and nudges don’t work at all for the
building of infrastructure. It might often be necessary to go well beyond
the nudge; maybe a push is necessary in some circumstances, as the
Bloomberg administration often did.

Conclusion
Overall, this Article provides a new taxonomy to understand the
different types of regulation. Using examples from New York City, we
have learned that certain approaches are more appropriate than others.
In general, we need more forceful nudges than we have seen to date in
some areas and, where this kind of push is not yet possible, we need to
lay the groundwork with some norm-shifting regulation that might be
more palatable politically or to the public. Infrastructure shifts can also
be a more successful type of intervention where more intrusive
regulation fails. In this way, local governments are embracing the notion
that government regulation can be more creative in pursuing alternative
forms of regulation, can be a force for good, and can enhance market
244
regulation. The more creative regulatory approaches seen in New York
City and the power of norm-shifting thesis are both outgrowths of this
general idea.
In a New York Law Journal Op-Ed piece Professor Michael
Gerrard, more or less, accurately summarized Bloomberg’s
environmental record: “To sum it all up, Bloomberg’s environmental
achievements far exceeded his promises in most areas . . . . The biggest

But behavioral insights can improve many policies he said. “It’s when this is generalized
that we could be talking about billions,” he said.
All because most of us want to fit in?
“Look,” he said. “Human beings are social animals.”
Id.
242. Choice architecture is defined as how the timing and context in which options are presented,
matters. Thaler & Sunstein, supra note 239, at 83.
243. Id. at 251.
244. Lessig, supra note 7, at 666, 672 (“But unlike the old school, the new school does not see these
alternatives as displacing law. Rather, the new school views them as each subject to law . . . . Law can
select among these various techniques in selecting the end it wants to achieve. Which it selects
depends on the return from each.”).
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disappointment has probably been the failure of the mayor’s congestion
245
pricing plan.” Indeed, the New York experience during the Bloomberg
years provides us with some broader insights in addition to the more
specific conclusions drawn in Part III.
Law is a workable tool to change individual behavior, and major
government action can influence social norms. Thus, infrastructure and
246
personal choice are subject to law. Policymakers should thus work to
combine strategies; for example, they should rehabilitate traditional
regulatory tools through initial nudging to allow for stronger political
outcomes and offering a more temporal solution such as waiting to phase
in initiatives following their passage. That said, cities should not fear
reliance on strong traditional regulation—“pushes”—to get at individual
actions, despite potential political challenges, as exemplified by
congestion pricing’s failure.
247
New York City, due to its public cachet, can act as a norms leader,
even if not actually the first mover, to initiate change in other urban
centers and national politics, as seen in the popularity of smoking bans
and the requirement for food menu labeling in the federal Affordable
Care Act. And going further, through PlaNYC, New York should better
foster neighborhood innovation and infrastructure development.
The future for New York City and its ability to continue to be on
the cutting edge of sustainability (at least from a U.S. perspective) is
unclear. However, in Mayor de Blasio’s campaign document, “A
Framework for a Sustainable City,” he set “‘a goal of zero waste in New
York’, by ‘strengthening and expanding existing recycling, instituting
composting programs, and establishing waste reduction programs,
including, for example, bans on plastic bags and requiring more materials
248
to be recyclable or compostable.’” While the Mayor de Blasio says he
249
plans to continue and extend most of his predecessor’s policies, it
remains to be seen if New York City will learn and adapt from the
successes and failures of its past.
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